Despite repeated calls to prohibit or limit conflicts of
interests among authors and sponsors of clinical guidelines, the problem
persists. Jeanne Lenzer investigates
On 13
April 1990, in an unprecedented action, the US National Institutes of Health faxed
a letter to every physician in the US
on how to correctly prescribe a breakthrough treatment for acute spinal cord
injury. Many neurosurgeons were sceptical of the evidence that lay behind the
new recommendation to give high dose steroids, yet when two respected organisations
released a review and a guideline
recommending the treatment, they felt obliged to give it. Now, over two decades
later, new
guidelines warn against the serious harms of high dose steroids. This case and others
like it point to the ethical
difficulties that doctors face when biased guidelines are promoted and raise
the question: why do processes intended to prevent or reduce bias fail?
Doctors who are sceptical about the scientific
basis of clinical guidelines have two choices: they can follow guidelines even
though they suspect doing so will cause harm, or they can ignore them and do
what they believe is right for their patients, thereby risking professional censure
and possibly jeopardising their
careers.1 2 34 This is no mere
theoretical dilemma; there is evidence that even when doctors believe a
guideline is likely to be harmful and compromised by bias, a substantial number
follow it.5
Disturbing precedent
In the early 1990s, high dose steroids
became the standard of care for acute spinal cord injury,6 reinforced by a Cochrane review. The
Cochrane Collaboration, is widely known to have strict standards concerning
conflicts of interest, yet in this case the collaboration permitted Michael
Bracken, who declared he was an occasional consultant to steroid manufacturers
Pharmacia and Upjohn, to serve as the sole reviewer.7 He was also the lead
researcher on the single landmark study, published in the New
England Journal of Medicine,8 used to support the Cochrane review.
Neurosurgeons were not convinced. Many expressed concern about high rates of
infection, prolonged hospital stays, and death with high dose steroids.9 10 One expert estimated that
more patients had been killed by the treatment in the past decade than died in
the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks.5
A poll of over 1000 neurosurgeons showed
that only 11% believed the treatment was safe and effective. Only 6% thought it should
be a standard of
care. Yet when asked if they would continue prescribing the treatment, 60% said
that they would. Many cited a fear of malpractice if they
failed to follow “a standard of care.”5
That standard was reversed this March, when
the Congress of Neurological Surgeons issued new guidelines. The congress found
that, “There is no Class I or Class II medicine evidence supporting the benefit
of [steroids] in the treatment of acute [spinal cord injury]. However, Class I, II,
and III evidence
exists that high-dose steroids are associated with harmful side effects
including death.”11
Manufacturing consensus
Guidelines
are usually issued by large panels of authors representing specialty and other
professional organisations. While it might seem difficult to bias a guideline
with so many experts participating under the sponsorship of large professional
bodies, a worrying number of cases
suggests that it may be common.
A
recent survey found that 71% of chairs of clinical policy committees and 90.5%
of co-chairs had financial conflicts.12 Such conflicts can have a
strong impact: FDA advisers reviewing the safety record of the progestogen
drospirenone voted that the drug’s benefits outweighed any risks. However, a
substantial number of the advisers had ties to the manufacturer and if their
votes had been excluded the decision would have been reversed.13 [Used
in birth control
pills, Drospirenone causes a 6 fold increase in blood clot—the most common
serious side effect of birth control pills.]
Biased guidelines can have powerful and
wide ranging effects. Thousands of guidelines have been issued,14 and, when promulgated by
highly respected professional societies, they sometimes serve as de facto
“standards of care” that may be used to devise institutional protocols, to
develop measures of physician performance, and for insurance coverage
decisions. Guidelines may influence the medicines selected for inclusion on
drug formularies and may be used as a “reliable authority” to support expert
testimony in malpractice suits.4 Eighty four per cent of doctors say they are
concerned about
industry influence over clinical guidelines,12 yet the fear of malpractice suits puts them
in an untenable
position of following guidelines they believe are flawed or dangerous to
patients.
Despite repeated calls to prohibit or limit
conflicts of interests among guideline authors15 16 and their sponsors, most
guideline panellists have conflicts,17making
the guidelines
they issue less than reliable.
Exuberant claims for alteplase
in stroke
A similar scenario may be playing out for
the use of the thrombolytic drug alteplase in acute stroke. Earlier this year,
the American College of Emergency Physicians with the American Academy of
Neurology (jointly)18 and the American Heart
Association,19 separately, issued grade
A level of evidence guidelines for alteplase in acute stroke. The simultaneous
recommendation by three respected professional societies would seem to indicate
overwhelming support for the treatment and consistent evidence. However, an
online poll of 548 emergency physicians showed that only 16% support the new
guidelines.20 Although the poll was not
scientific, other surveys show substantial scepticism among emergency
physicians and the treatment remains contentious.21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Guideline authors say that opposition to
the guidelines is insubstantial. Andy Jagoda, a member of the guideline
committee and professor and chair of emergency medicine at Mount Sinai School
of Medicine, said that “almost all” resident physicians “believe in tPA
[alteplase] for stroke.” Another guideline author, Steven R Messe, assistant
professor of neurology at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania and
the Pennsylvania Hospital, told the BMJ that
“only a small, vocal minority [of emergency physicians] are opposed.”
An earlier survey claimed that emergency
physicians don’t oppose alteplase for stroke. At a glance, the claim seemed
justified: the poll found that 83% of the doctors surveyed said they would give
the treatment.21 However, when asked
whether “the science supports the use of tPA [alteplase],” only 49% agreed.
Alteplase was approved for acute stroke
after the 1995 National Institutes of Neurologic Diseases and Stroke (NINDS)
trial showed a 13% absolute reduction in disability.28 Advocates quickly began
to promote the treatment with exuberant claims. The American Heart Association
said it could “save lives,” a claim the organisation was forced to withdraw in
2002 when it was pointed out that no study had shown a mortality benefit.29 In 2007, leading stroke
experts with industry ties repeated the “saves lives” claim in the New
York Times, suggesting that far too few stroke patients were
receiving the drug, largely because of resistance among emergency physicians.
The newspaper later published a brief correction stating there was no evidence
to support the claim that the drug saved lives.30
But as
with steroids for acute spinal cord injury, claims of benefit rest on science
that is contested. Sceptics say that
baseline imbalances, the use of subset analyses, and chance alone could account
for the claimed benefit.24 26 31 32 33 They also note that only two of 12 randomised
controlled trials
of thrombolytics have shown benefit and five had to be terminated early because
of lack of benefit, higher mortality, and significant increases in brain
haemorrhage.33
In addition, the guideline committee did
not include the largest study of the treatment to date in its analysis. Messe,
who was one of the guideline’s authors and a spokesperson until April 2011 for
Boehringer Ingelheim, Genentech’s European marketing partner, told the BMJ that the joint panel did not include
the International Stroke Treatment-3 (IST-3) Trial because the outcome “showed
a benefit” among subgroups and because the patients treated were not the same
population as in the NINDS trial. However, the effect on the primary outcome in
IST-3 (treatment of stroke from 0-6 hours) was actually negative, and the
claimed benefits were based on secondary, exploratory analyses. When this was
pointed out, Messe acknowledged that the primary outcome was negative and said,
“No one has claimed, nor do we recommend, treatment up to 6 hours.”
The new grade A recommendation by the
American College of Emergency Physicians is seen as particularly surprising
because emergency physicians have been the strongest critics of the treatment.
In a survey of 1105 emergency doctors, 40% said they were “not likely to use”
alteplase for acute stroke even under the ideal conditions recommended by the
NINDS protocol.34 Two thirds of those
doctors cited the risk of symptomatic intracerebral haemorrhage as the factor
that most concerned them. A quarter cited the lack of clear treatment benefit.34 Their concerns seem
understandable in light of a Cochrane review of pooled effects that showed alteplase
increased fatal intracerebral
haemorrhage nearly fourfold, and that thrombolytics overall were associated
with a significant increase in mortality by the end of follow-up, representing
an extra 30 deaths per 1000 treated patients.35
Curt Furberg, a prominent methodologist and
former Food and Drug Administration adviser, told the BMJ:
“The most powerful evidence comes from the Cochrane pooled analysis.” Furberg
objected to the use of subgroup analyses to prove benefit, saying, “When
clinical trial results are heterogeneous, it’s important to look at the
totality of evidence. You should never draw firm conclusions from post hoc analyses.
You can’t just select data that supports the thesis you like by asking, ‘How do
the results look at 2 hours? How about 2 hours and 10 minutes? How about 3
hours?’ By chance alone you will find something that supports your bias.”
Best guidelines influence can
buy: how it happens
Proponents
of alteplase have launched
projects to ensure uptake of the guidelines in the US, such as the development
of “stroke certified hospitals,” which require hospitals to commit resources to
enable rapid administration of alteplase to eligible stroke patients. Since ambulances
divert
patients with suggestive symptoms to stroke certified hospitals, the project
has substantial financial ramifications. These efforts, and others like the “Brain
Attack” campaign, have been
actively supported by the American Heart Association and American Stroke
Association, which “partnered” with the Joint Commission (a quasi-governmental
agency that accredits hospitals) to promote hospital stroke certification. Genentech,
Boehringer Ingelheim and Novo
Nordisk, which market alteplase, have contributed tens of millions of dollars
to the associations.
In its newly released guidelines, the
American Heart Association states that it “makes every effort to avoid any
actual or potential conflicts of interest that may arise as a result of . . . a
business interest of a member of the writing panel.” However, according to
their conflict of interest disclosure statements, 13 of the 15 authors had ties
to the manufacturers of products to diagnose and treat acute stroke; 11 had ties
to companies that market
alteplase.19 In 2010, two years after
the association launched this guideline panel, it revised its financial
conflicts policy; in the future, neither committee chairs nor the majority of
its guideline writing members may have any relevant ties to industry.
Concern about the credibility of guidelines
led the Institute of Medicine to recommend that ideally no guideline authors
should have financial conflicts of interest.14 If individuals who have
professional conflicts that can’t be divested (for example, specialists whose
career depends on treating a certain condition) are included, the institute
recommends that they “should represent not more than a minority” of the
panellists.14 [Such requirements by the professional
organizations is mere window dressing, for business continues as before, there hasn’t
been a flock of changes in protocols.]
In the guidelines issued jointly by the
American College of Emergency Physicians and the American Academy of Neurology,
three of eight panellists disclosed ties to the manufacturers. However, seven
had either direct ties to the manufacturer or indirect ties, knowingly or not,
through affiliations with the Foundation for Education and Research in
Neurological Emergencies (FERNE), which provides unrestricted continuing
medical education grants (table⇓). Guideline
readers were unlikely to know that according to its
2008 tax return, 100% of the $97 000
donated to the foundation that year came from drug companies, including $50 000
from Genentech. The foundation president and founder, Edward P Sloan, is an
outspoken advocate of alteplase for stroke.36
Competing interests of
authors of American College of Emergency Physicians and the American Academy of
Neurology guidelines on alteplase
Author
|
Competing interest
|
Disclosed
|
Edlow
|
FERNE
|
Yes
|
Smith
|
Genentech
|
Yes
|
Stead
|
No
| |
Gronseth
|
Boehringer Ingelheim
|
Yes
|
Messe
|
Boehringer Ingelheim
|
Yes
|
Jagoda
|
FERNE only
| |
Wears
|
Speaker for FERNE* (not stroke
related)
|
No
|
Decker
|
Adviser and speaker for FERNE*
|
No
|
For all guidelines, the
overwhelming majority of committee chairs and co-chairs have ties
to industry,12 and selection of panellists with desired viewpoints can make a
wished for outcome a foregone conclusion. Committee stacking may be one of the
most powerful and important tools to achieve a desired outcome. Seven of the eight
panellists had
previously published or lectured on the merits of alteplase for stroke. The
eighth panellist, Robert Wears, described himself as an “agnostic” but added
that he was “surprised” that he was named as an author since he had resigned
from the committee six years earlier. Not one sceptic was included on the panel. In response to a question about
whether any known sceptics were invited to be on the committee, a spokesperson
for the American Academy of Neurology said, “A potential panel member’s opinion
on a topic does not determine eligibility for participation on an American
Academy of Neurology guideline author panel. The guideline development process
is evidence based.”
Wears, a highly respected methodologist and
professor of emergency medicine at the University of Florida Health Sciences
Center, had been the methodologist for the committee. He told the BMJ that he
resigned in part because he was growing increasingly “disillusioned” with the
guideline process. When asked why Wears’ name appeared as one of the committee
members, Rhonda Whitson, clinical practice manager for the college told the BMJ, “He may
have thought his role on the tPA panel ended sooner than it did . . . However,
he did participate throughout the project as needed for his role.”
A spokesperson for the Annals
of Emergency Medicine, which published the clinical policy,
explained how Wears’ name was able to appear in the journal. She told theBMJ that it
does not peer review the college’s clinical policies; nor does it vet the
authors or members of the development panel.
Widespread problem
Many other conflicted guidelines have come
to light in recent years. In 2006, the New
England Journal of Medicine published an article warning against
aggressive treatment of anaemia with erythropoietin in patients with kidney
disease. Patients treated aggressively had increased rates of heart failure and
need for dialysis.37Yet guidelines
issued in 2007 by the National Kidney Foundation,
which received multimillion dollar donations from companies that make
erythropoietin, recommended aggressive treatment that would increase the number
of patients receiving the drug.38
In 2004, newly issued cholesterol
guidelines greatly expanded the number of people for whom treatment is
recommended. A firestorm broke out when it was learnt that all but one of the
guideline authors had ties to the manufacturers of cholesterol lowering drugs.39
Yet
these and other guidelines continue to be followed despite concerns about bias,
because as one lecturer told a meeting on geriatric care in the Virgin Islands
earlier this year, “We like to stick within the standard of care, because when
the shit hits the fan we all want to be able to say we were just doing what
everyone else is doing—even if what everyone else is doing isn’t very good.”
Notes
Cite this as: BMJ 2013;346:f3830
Footnotes
·
Competing
interests: I have read and understood the BMJ Group
policy on declaration of interests and have no relevant interests to declare.
·
Provenance
and peer review: Commissioned; not externally peer
reviewed.
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